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Bayer AG v. Housey Pharmaceuticals: Protection for 
Biotechnological Research Tools under Section 271(g) 
Found Wanting 
MATTHEW BARTHALOW* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Research tools, a subset of  biotechnological inventions protected by 
process patents, are “tools that scientists use in the laboratory, including 
cell lines, monoclonal antibodies, reagents, animal models, growth factors, 
combinatorial chemistry and DNA libraries, clones and cloning tools (such 
as PCR), methods, laboratory equipment and machines.”1  Many compa-
nies base their business models on the ability to find pharmaceutical prod-
ucts using their proprietary drug discovery research tools.2  Research tools 
used for drug discovery “include bioinformatic methods for identifying the 
interaction of certain proteins and their association with disease, methods 
for confirming protein targets, screening assays to identify molecules ac-
tive against a target, and safety profiling assays.”3   
Congress enacted the Process Patent Amendments Act of 1988 
(“PPAA”) as part of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 
1988.4  Congress enacted 35 U.S.C. § 271(g)5 of the PPAA to broaden 
  
    *  J.D. Candidate, 2006, Franklin Pierce Law Center – Concord, N.H.; M.S. Applied Molecular 
Biology, 2003, University of Maryland Baltimore County – Catonsville, Md.; B.S. Biochemistry, 2002, 
University of Maryland Baltimore County – Catonsville, Md.  I would like to thank the following 
Pierce Law Review editors for their assistance with this article: Soumya Panda, Christopher Hanba, 
Ron Sia, Heather Menezes, Jonathan Wise, Paul Homer, and Alison Bethel.  I would also like to thank 
Professor Craig Jepson for his thoughtful feedback and the Pierce Law Review Advisor, Professor 
Jeffrey Roy. 
 1. 64 Fed. Reg. 72,090, 72,092 n.1 (Dec. 23, 1999). 
 2. Nicholas Groombridge & Sheryl Calabro, Integra Lifesciences v. Merck – Good for Research or 
Just Good for Research Tool Patent Owners?, 22 Biotechnology L. Rep. 462, 462 (2003). 
 3. M. Patricia Thayer & Michelle M. Umberger, Enforcing U.S. Method Patents: How Much 
Protection Does 35 U.S.C. Section 271(g) Really Provide, 4 Sedona Conf. J. 85, 86 (2003). 
 4. Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107, 1107 (1988). 
 5. (g) Whoever without authority imports into the United States or offers to sell, sells, or uses 
within the United States a product which is made by a process patented in the United States shall be 
liable as an infringer, if the importation, offer to sell, sale, or use of the product occurs during the term 
of such process patent. In an action for infringement of a process patent, no remedy may be granted for 
infringement on account of the noncommercial use or retail sale of a product unless there is no ade-
quate remedy under this title for infringement on account of the importation or other use, offer to sell, 
or sale of that product. A product which is made by a patented process will, for purposes of this title, 
not be considered to be so made after— 
(1) it is materially changed by subsequent processes; or 
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process patent protection by providing a remedy for a United States pat-
entee where the patented process was used abroad and the product made by 
the patented process was subsequently imported, offered for sale, sold, or 
used in the United States.6   
Congress addressed the application of the PPAA to biotechnology 
process patents.7  Specifically, the legislative history of the PPAA ad-
dressed the likely possibility that a foreign manufacturer would use a pat-
ented process to clone a gene into a plasmid and deliver the plasmid to a 
bacterial host.8  As a result, Congress determined that infringement would 
occur when the protein product encoded by the gene is imported, offered 
for sale, sold, or used in the United States without authorization by the 
United States patentee.9    
This legislative history aided the Court of Appeals for the Federal Cir-
cuit (“Federal Circuit”) in Bio-Technology General Corp. v. Genentech, 
Inc.,10 the only Federal Circuit case to interpret “made by” under section 
271(g).11  In Bio-Technology, the Federal Circuit found that “[t]he legisla-
tive history precisely anticipated this fact situation and indicated Con-
gress’s intent that infringement of a process for making a plasmid is not to 
be avoided by using it to express its intended protein.”12 
Unfortunately, the legislative history does not directly address whether 
a drug candidate is a “product” under section 271(g) when a patented re-
search tool is used to identify the drug candidate.13  Thus, Congress did not 
anticipate the fact pattern developed in Bayer AG v. Housey Pharmaceuti-
cals,14 which required the Federal Circuit to interpret section 271(g) in 
relation to the use of a patented research tool abroad.15  The Federal Circuit 
held that the word “product” refers to a “physical good” and “made” is 
synonymous with “manufactured.”16  More specifically, the court held 
“that in order for a product to have been ‘made by a process patented in the 
United States[,]’ the product must be a physical article that was ‘manufac-
  
(2) it becomes a trivial and nonessential component of another product.  
 
35 U.S.C. §271(g) (2000). 
 6. Sen. Rpt. 100-83 at 2 (June 23, 1987). 
 7. Id. at 30. 
 8. Id. at 49. 
 9. Id. 
 10. 80 F.3d 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
 11. Id. at 1561. 
 12. Id. 
 13. See Sen. Rpt. 100-83 at 49. 
 14. 340 F.3d 1367 (Fed Cir. 2003). 
 15. See id. 
 16. Id. at 1372. 
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tured.’”17  Therefore, the production of information is not a “product” un-
der section 271(g).18  Additionally, “the process must be used directly in 
the manufacture of the product, and not merely as a predicate process to 
identify the product to be manufactured.”19 
This article argues that section 271(g) should be broadened to encom-
pass as an infringing act the use of a drug candidate in the United States 
when discovered by a patented research tool used abroad.  Specifically, 
this article proposes that the courts should interpret the word “product” to 
cover the discovery of the drug as embodied by the actual drug.  The 
phrase “made by” should extend to all steps taken to bring a drug to market 
rather than be limited to physical “manufacturing.” 
This article will discuss the PPAA and the Bio-Technology case as 
background to the Bayer decision,20 and will further explore the reasoning 
adopted by the Federal Circuit in Bayer.21  As part of a critical analysis of 
the Federal Circuit’s reasoning in Bayer, this article will argue that section 
287 cannot be used to limit the scope of section 271(g) because Congress 
enacted section 287(b) only to address the concerns of importers of goods 
manufactured abroad.22  Additionally, the exceptions in section 271(g) 
should not be limited  to “manufactured” physical goods because the ex-
ceptions were purposefully crafted to be narrow.23  Moreover, section 
271(g) was intended to broaden International Trade Commission (“ITC”) 
protection.24  Congress enacted section 271(g) to provide remedies to par-
ties that could not seek relief through the ITC and to provide the patent-
type infringement analysis the federal courts were in the best position to 
provide.25  Further, Congress intended section 271(g) to apply to the com-
mercial use of biotechnological patented process abroad even if the product 
of the use will not be manufactured by the process directly.26  Still further, 
Bayer is analogous to Bio-Technology because the discovery of an impor-
tant biological property of a drug candidate is the product and is embodied 
in the drug itself.27  Finally, this article will show how sound economic 
policy encourages this interpretation.28 
  
 17. Id. at 1377. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id.  
 20. Infra pts. II(B)-(C). 
 21. Infra pt. III. 
 22. Infra pt. IV(B). 
 23. Infra pt. IV(C). 
 24. Infra pt. IV(D). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Infra pt. IV(E). 
 27. Infra pt. IV(F).  
 28. Infra pt. V. 
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The Federal Circuit strongly supported domestic protection of biotech-
nology research tool patents in the recent Integra Lifesciences v. Merck 
decision.29  The protection afforded in Integra cannot be reconciled with 
the lack of protection in Bayer because strong domestic protection of re-
search tools is incompatible with a lack of foreign protection.30  As it now 
stands, companies will be encouraged to perform pre-clinical research 
abroad.31 
II.  BACKGROUND 
A. Patented Research Tools and Enforcement Thereof 
Scientists performing biotechnology related research use research tools 
everyday.  The National Institutes of Health has defined research tools as 
“tools that scientists use in the laboratory, including cell lines, monoclonal 
antibodies, reagents, animal models, growth factors, combinatorial chemis-
try and DNA libraries, clones and cloning tools (such as PCR), methods, 
laboratory equipment and machines.”32  This article limits research tools to 
tools used in the development of new biotechnological or pharmaceutical 
products where the products do not themselves physically incorporate the 
research tool.33  
Although it is argued that the “stacking”34 of research tool patents are 
creating transaction costs that effectively prevent scientists from using 
these tools, research tools continue to receive patent protection in the 
United States.35  In the past, the perceived transaction costs associated with 
“stacking” has led many to believe that the courts were adverse to research 
tool patentees.36 
Further, there are challenges associated with the domestic enforcement 
of research tool patents.37  These challenges include: (1) patent misuse as a 
common defense to an infringement claim when the research tool patent is 
asserted against the end product; (2) validity attacks on the patent for lack-
  
 29. 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 27796 (opinion previously reported at 331 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2003)); 
infra pt. V(A). 
 30. Infra pt. V(B). 
 31. Id. 
 32. 64 Fed. Reg. at 72,092 n.1. 
 33. See Janice M. Mueller, No “Dilettante Affair”: Rethinking the Experimental Use Exception to 
Patent Infringement for Biomedical Research Tools, 76 Wash. L. Rev. 1, 14 (2001). 
 34. “Stacking” is the need for multiple patents from different owners in order to carry out research. 
 35. Mueller, supra n. 33, at 7-8.  
 36. See generally Groombridge, supra n. 2, at 462. 
 37. See Steven J. Hultquist, Reach-Through Royalties: The Scope of Research Tool Patents, 86 J. 
Pat. & Trademark Off. Socy. 285, 286 (2004). 
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ing a written description of the end product; (3) that damages cannot be 
imposed when the product of the patented process is only knowledge or 
information; and (4) problems associated with determining a reasonable 
royalty.38   
Notwithstanding arguments against and challenges associated with 
domestic enforcement, many biotechnological and pharmaceutical compa-
nies have invested heavily in the patenting of research tools.39  Many com-
panies base their business models on the ability to find biotechnological or 
pharmaceutical products using their proprietary drug discovery tools.40  
Tools used for drug discovery “include bioinformatic methods for identify-
ing the interaction of certain proteins and their association with disease, 
methods for confirming protein targets, screening assays to identify mole-
cules active against a target, and safety profiling assays.”41   
Other companies have effectively circumvented United States patent 
protection for research tools.42  In the industry it “is no secret that more 
than a few biotech and pharmaceutical companies perform drug discovery 
offshore and then import the results” to circumvent domestic protection.43  
As a result, offshore drug discovery creates tension between companies 
owning research tool patents and those companies who seek to use the re-
search tools to perform drug discovery.44  
B. The Process Patent Amendments Act of 1988 
The PPAA broadened process patent protection to encompass many 
foreign acts that had previously been used to circumvent United States 
patent protection.45  The legislative history of the PPAA directly states the 
“importance of protecting ‘new manufacturing techniques’ and emphasizes 
the need to prohibit the importation of any ‘product,’ ‘substance,’ ‘good,’ 
and ‘tangible item’ made by patented processes.”46  One articulation of the 
purpose of the PPAA was to grant patentees a “right to sue for damages 
and seek an injunction in a federal district court when someone, without 
authorization, uses or sells in the United States, or imports into the United 
  
 38. A per-use royalty basis may be grossly disproportionate to the end value realized by the user of 
the research tool, while reach through royalties based on the value of the end product faces the same 
challenges as described for enforcement of process patents generally.  Id. at 286. 
 39. Thayer, supra n. 3, at 86. 
 40. Groombridge, supra n. 2, at 462. 
 41. Thayer, supra n. 3, at 86. 
 42. See Donald J. Featherstone & Jorge A. Goldstein, Federal Circuit Holds that Importing Data is 
Not Patent Infringement, 10 No. 2 Intell. Prop. Strategist 1, 1 (2003).  
 43. Id. 
 44. Groombridge, supra n. 2, at 462. 
 45. See Sen. Rpt. 100-83 at 29-31. 
 46. Thayer, supra n. 3, at 88. 
File: Barthalow (macro) Created on:  12/20/2005 12:16:00 AM Last Printed: 12/20/2005 12:25:00 AM 
100 PIERCE LAW REVIEW Vol. 4, No. 1 
States a product made by their patented process.”47 Additionally, Congress 
enacted the PPAA as a response to Deepsouth Packing v. Laitram, “which 
held that the intentional exportation of components [from the U.S.] to be 
combined into a patented article was not an act of infringement.”48  Con-
gress sought to prohibit this act through the PPAA.49    
C. Bio-Technology v. Genentech: Anticipated by Congress 
In Bio-Technology, the only Federal Circuit decision to interpret 
“made by” under section 271(g), the Federal Circuit found that the legisla-
tive history of the PPAA anticipated the facts.50  Genentech was the as-
signee of two patents directed to a method for producing human growth 
hormone (“hGH”).51  The first patent provides a method for directly ex-
pressing hGH in a bacterial host by using “a recombinant DNA method for 
producing a 191- or 192- amino acid human growth hormone product that 
is identical, or essentially identical, and functionally equivalent to the natu-
ral hormone.”52  The method provides for modification of the hGH cDNA53 
by removing the leader sequence and replacing the leader sequence with a 
bacterial leader sequence.54  The modified hGH cDNA is directly inserted 
into bacterial cells for expression of the hGH protein.55  The second patent 
is for essentially the same process, except that the modified cDNA is first 
inserted into a plasmid,56 and then the plasmid is transferred into the bacte-
rial host.57  The bacterium expresses the hGH protein encoded by the hGH 
gene located on the plasmid.58   
  
 47. Sen. Rpt. 100-83 at 29. 
 48. Bayer, 340 F.3d at 1374. 
 49. Id. 
 50. 80 F.3d at 1561. 
 51. Id. at 1556.  
 52. Id. 
 53. While a human gene encoded by DNA has sequences that are both translated into the amino 
acids that form a protein and sequences that are not translated, cDNA contains only the sequences that 
are translated into the amino acid sequence that make the final protein product.  Biotechterms, 
http://biotechterms.org/sourcebook/savelinktermquery.php3?COMPLEMENTARY%DNA%(cDNA) 
(accessed November 17, 2005).   
 54. Bio-Technology, 80 F.3d at 1557. 
 55. By “directly inserted,” the method provides that the cDNA will splice (placed within) a particu-
lar site on a bacterial chromosome where the bacteria cell will express the hGH protein of the modified 
hGH gene.  Id.   
 56. A “plasmid” is a piece of DNA separate from bacterial chromosomes that is capable of being 
inserted into the bacteria and the genes on the plasmid are expressed by the same mechanism that 
expresses genes on a bacterial chromosome.  Biotechterms, http://biotechterms.org/sourcebook/ 
saveidretrieve.php3?id=1486 (accessed November 17, 2005). 
 57. Bio-Technology, 80 F.3d at 1557. 
 58. Id. 
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In district court, Genentech counter-claimed against Bio-Technology 
General (“BTG”) and moved for a preliminary injunction.  Genentech ar-
gued that importation by BTG of hGH from Israel would literally infringe 
under section 271(g).  The district court granted the motion for a prelimi-
nary injunction.59   
In the Federal Circuit, the issue in Bio-Technology was whether hGH 
was a product of the patented process.60  Because “the plasmid product of 
the claimed process and hGH are entirely different materials, one being 
more than materially changed in relation to the other,” BTG argued that 
hGH was not “made by” the process.61  The Federal Circuit found, how-
ever, that “[t]he legislative history precisely anticipated this fact situation 
and indicated Congress’s intent that infringement of a process for making a 
plasmid is not to be avoided by using it to express its intended protein.”62  
Therefore, the Federal Circuit held that there was no error in the district 
court’s determination that hGH is “made by” the patented process.63   
The holding in Bio-Technology is narrow and only holds that a protein 
is a product that is “made by” a process directed to genetically engineer a 
bacterium to produce the desired protein.  As will be discussed below, the 
holding in Bayer is also narrow and only interprets “made by” in relation 
to a patented research tool used abroad.  Nevertheless, the Bayer decision 
has consequences that affect the whole biotechnological and pharmaceuti-
cal industry.    
III.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE: BAYER AG V. HOUSEY PHARMACEUTICALS 
A. Background 
Housey was the assignee of three United States patents all entitled 
“Method of Screening for Protein Inhibitors and Activators.”64  The patents 
are directed to a method where a cell line engineered to over express a par-
ticular protein is compared to the original non-engineered cell line.65  By 
applying substances (e.g. drug candidates) to both cell lines, the method 
determines whether that substance is an inhibitor or activator of the protein 
of interest.66  Therefore, “if a link between a protein and a disease is dis-
  
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 1560. 
 61. Id. at 1561. 
 62. Id.   
 63. Id.   
 64. Bayer, 340 F.3d at 1368-69. 
 65. Id. at 1369.   
 66. Id.   
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covered, the disclosed method provides a process for identifying the effect 
that different agents [e.g. drug candidates] have on the activity of the sus-
pect protein.”67  In other words, an established link between a protein and a 
disease allows the method to identify potential drug candidates.68 
On March 6, 2001, Bayer brought suit in United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware, seeking a declaratory judgment that the pat-
ents were invalid, unenforceable, and not infringed by Bayer.69  Housey 
counter-claimed that Bayer directly contributed to the infringement of the 
patents under section 271(g).70  Housey asserted pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 
295 that there was a substantial likelihood that the methods used by Bayer 
to identify a potential drug candidate infringed patents owned by Housey.71  
Bayer filed a motion to dismiss arguing that section 271(g) “applies only to 
methods of manufacture,” and does not “cover methods of use.”72 
The district court found the infringement claim to be twofold.  One, in-
fringement based on the sale of a drug identified by the patented method in 
the United States.  Two, infringement based on the importation into or use 
in the United States of knowledge and information associated with the 
identification of the drug using the patented method.  The district court 
dismissed the infringement claim because “upon the plain reading of the 
statute. . .[s]ection 271(g) addresses only products derived from patented 
manufacturing processes.”73   
B. Federal Circuit Analysis 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit found that the plain meaning of “made 
by” was ambiguous.  The parties did not dispute that if “made by” meant 
“manufacture,” then the statute must only refer to “physical goods.”  The 
Federal Circuit found that dictionaries had both narrow and broad defini-
tions of “made” that were and were not limited to “manufacturing.”  Be-
cause the text of section 271(g) was ambiguous, the court looked to other 
provisions within the statute for guidance.74   
The Federal Circuit reasoned that “[b]y referring to the party that pro-
duces a product as a ‘manufacturer’ and the maker as a ‘person engaged in 
the manufacture of a product,’ the statute clearly contemplates that ‘made’ 
means ‘manufactured.’” The reasoning relied on section 287(b)(3)(B)(iii) 
  
 67. Id.   
 68. Id. 
 69. Id.   
 70. Id.   
 71. Id.   
 72. Id. at 1370.   
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 1372.  
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of the PPAA, where “the Act describes a person that uses a patented proc-
ess to ‘produce’ a product as a ‘manufacturer.’”  Further, the court cited 
section 287(b)(4)(A) reference to “‘a person then engaged in the manufac-
ture of a product’ as a person that makes the product” for additional sup-
port.75   
Moreover, the Federal Circuit found other reasons to conclude “that 
the statute is concerned exclusively with products that are physical goods 
produced by a manufacturing process” based on the exceptions in section 
271(g).76  The court found the statutory exception of section 271(g), which 
“rules out infringement where the allegedly infringing product ‘is materi-
ally changed by a subsequent processes[,]’” difficult to apply to informa-
tion itself.77  Similarly, the court had difficulty applying the second com-
ponent exception to information.78 The second exception applies when “the 
accused product ‘becomes a trivial and nonessential component of another 
product.’”79  The Federal Circuit found that the second exception “also 
appears to contemplate a physical product.”80  Housey argued that Con-
gress would use “manufacture” if it purposely meant to narrow the stat-
ute.81 Nevertheless, the court rejected this argument because “Congress, 
needless to say, is permitted to use synonyms in a statute.”82 
The court next turned to the legislative history and found no affirma-
tive attempt by Congress to protect information as a product.83  The Fed-
eral Circuit found that section 271(g) was enacted “to provide new reme-
dies to supplement existing remedies available from the International 
Trade Commission (“ITC”) under 19 U.S.C. § 1337.”84  Specifically, sec-
tion 271(g) “address[es] the same ‘articles’ as were addressed by section 
1337, but [adds] additional rights against importers of such ‘articles.’”85  
Nevertheless, the court found nothing in section 1337 suggesting that in-
formation was covered.86 
Although the Federal Circuit found nothing to suggest section 1337 
covered information as a product, the court noted that “the legislative his-
tory did not affirmatively [intend] to limit coverage to [only] manufactured 
  
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 1372-73.   
 78. Id.  
 79. Id. at 1373.   
 80. Id.  
 81. Id. 
 82. Id.   
 83. Id. at 1374, n. 9. 
 84. Id. at 1373. 
 85. Id. at 1374.   
 86. Id.   
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‘articles.’”87  Citing two Senate Reports, the Federal Circuit explained that 
the aim of section 271(g) was “to declare it to be patent infringement to 
import into, or to use or sell in the United States, a product manufactured 
by a patented process.”88  The court explained that “the primary target of 
the United States process patentholder will naturally be the manufacturer, 
who is practicing the process and importing the resulting goods into the 
United States.”89  Additionally, the court cited other congressional reports 
showing “concern over competition between domestic and foreign manu-
facturers.”90   
Despite congressional concern about foreign competition, the Federal 
Circuit was primarily concerned that “a person possessing the allegedly 
infringing information could, under Housey’s interpretation, possibly in-
fringe by merely entering the country.”91  The Federal Circuit concluded 
that “it is best to leave to Congress the task of expanding the statute if we 
are wrong in our interpretation.”92 
C. Holding   
Therefore, the Federal Circuit held “that in order for a product to have 
been ‘made by a process patented in the United States[,]’ it must have been 
a physical article that was ‘manufactured’ and that the production of in-
formation is not covered.” Next, the court determined “whether a drug that 
was identified as useful through the use of a patented process is a ‘product 
which [was] made by [that] process.’”  The court stated “it is beyond dis-
pute that a drug is a physical product that has been manufactured.” The 
court further distinguished the facts in Bayer from the facts in Bio-
Technology noting that “unlike the process in Bio-Technology, the patented 
process is not used in the actual synthesis of the drug product.” The Fed-
eral Circuit therefore held that “the process must be used directly in the 
manufacture of the product, and not merely as a predicate process to iden-
tify the product to be manufactured.”93 
  
 87. Id.   
 88. Id. (quoting Sen. Rpt. 98-663 at 1 (Sept. 24, 1984)). 
 89. Id. at 1375 (quoting Sen. Rpt. 100-83 at 39).   
 90. Id. at 1376. 
 91. Id.   
 92. Id. at 1376-77.   
 93. Id. at 1377.    
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IV.  CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S REASONING 
A. Introduction 
This note argues that section 271(g) should be broadened to encompass 
as an infringing act the use of a drug candidate in the United States when 
discovered by a patented research tool used abroad.  Specifically, this arti-
cle proposes that the courts interpret the word “product” to cover the dis-
covery of the drug as embodied by the actual drug.  The phrase “made by” 
should extend to all steps taken to bring a drug to market rather than be 
limited to physical “manufacturing.” 
This article agrees with the Federal Circuit in that information per se is 
not a “product” and that “it is beyond dispute that a drug is a physical 
product” under section 271(g).94  Further, “made by” is ambiguous accord-
ing to the plain meaning of the statute and can be interpreted broadly to 
encompass more than traditional “manufacturing.”95  Additionally, the 
Federal Circuit recognized that the legislative history of section 271(g) 
“did not affirmatively suggest an intent to limit coverage to manufactured 
‘articles.’”96  
Section 287 cannot be used to limit the scope of section 271(g).97  
Congress enacted section 287(b) to only address the concerns of importers 
of goods manufactured abroad.98  Additionally, the exceptions in section 
271(g) should not limit the scope of section 271(g) to “manufactured” 
physical goods.99  The exceptions in section 271(g) were purposefully 
crafted to be narrow.100  Moreover, section 271(g) was intended to broaden 
ITC protection.  Congress enacted section 271(g) to provide remedies to 
parties that could not seek relief through the ITC and to provide the patent-
type infringement analysis the federal courts were in the best position to 
provide.101  Further, Congress intended section 271(g) to apply to the com-
mercial use of biotechnological patented process abroad even if the product 
of the use will not be manufactured by the process directly.102  Still further, 
Bayer is analogous to Bio-Technology because the discovery of an impor-
tant biological property of a drug candidate is the product and is embodied 
  
 94. Supra n. 93. 
 95. Supra n. 74. 
 96. Bayer, 340 F.3d at 1374 (emphasis added). 
 97. Infra pt. IV(B). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Infra pt. IV(C). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Infra pt. IV(D). 
 102. Infra pt. IV(E). 
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in the drug itself.103  Finally, sound economic policy encourages this inter-
pretation.104  The Federal Circuit strongly supported domestic protection of 
biotechnology research tool patents in the recent Integra decision.105  The 
protection afforded in Integra cannot be reconciled with the lack of protec-
tion in Bayer.106  Strong domestic protection of research tools is incom-
patible with a lack of foreign protection because companies will be en-
couraged to perform pre-clinical research abroad.107 
B. Section 287(b) is Intended to be Narrower in Scope than Section 271(g) 
The Federal Circuit inference that “made by” under section 271(g) is 
equivalent to “manufactured” under section 287(b) is not justified.  Section 
287(b) cannot be used to limit the scope of section 271(g) because section 
271(g) was enacted to address the concerns of importers of goods manu-
facturers abroad.  35 U.S.C. § 287 is entitled Limitation on damages and 
other remedies; marking and notice.  Section 287(b) was enacted to pro-
vide “limitations on the remedies available to a process patentholder when 
infringement is based on” section 271(g).108  Section 287(b)(4)109 is a pro-
  
 103. Infra pt. IV(F).  
 104. Infra pt. V. 
 105. 331 F.3d 860; infra pt. V(A). 
 106. Infra pt. V(B). 
 107. Id. 
 108. Sen. Rpt. 100-83 at 52. 
 109. (4)(A) For purposes of this subsection, a “request for disclosure” means a written request made 
to a person then engaged in the manufacture of a product to identify all process patents owned by or 
licensed to that person, as of the time of the request, that the person then reasonably believes could be 
asserted to be infringed under section 271(g) if that product were imported into, or sold, offered for 
sale, or used in, the United States by an unauthorized person. A request for disclosure is further limited 
to a request-- 
(i) which is made by a person regularly engaged in the United States in the sale of the same type of 
products as those manufactured by the person to whom the request is directed, or which includes 
facts showing that the person making the request plans to engage in the sale of such products in the 
United States; 
(ii) which is made by such person before the person's first importation, use, offer for sale, or sale 
of units of the product produced by an infringing process and before the person had notice of in-
fringement with respect to the product; and 
(iii) which includes a representation by the person making the request that such person will 
promptly submit the patents identified pursuant to the request to the manufacturer, or if the manu-
facturer is not known, to the supplier, of the product to be purchased by the person making the re-
quest, and will request from that manufacturer or supplier a written statement that none of the 
processes claimed in those patents is used in the manufacture of the product. 
(B) In the case of a request for disclosure received by a person to whom a patent is licensed, that person 
shall either identify the patent or promptly notify the licensor of the request for disclosure. 
(C) A person who has marked, in the manner prescribed by subsection (a), the number of the process 
patent on all products made by the patented process which have been offered for sale or sold by that 
person in the United States, or imported by the person into the United States, before a request for dis-
closure is received is not required to respond to the request for disclosure. For purposes of the preced-
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cedure enacted to help non-manufacturing groups likely to violate section 
271(g) to obtain the necessary information from the manufacturers they 
receive goods from to avoid such a violation.110  The procedure outlined in 
section 287(b)(4) is “necessary because an importer of a product from a 
foreign manufacturer is ordinarily unable to obtain specific information 
from his supplier regarding the process used in manufacturing the imported 
product.”111   
The procedure described in section 287(b)(4) addresses the concerns of 
one limited group affected by the enactment of section 271(g), namely 
importers.  The first step in the procedure outlined in section 287(b)(4) is a 
formal request by a party “who is engaged in, or intends to be engaged in, 
the sale of a particular product.” The request is made to parties already 
engaged in the manufacture of the product and should be made before the 
requesting party participates in an activity that could constitute infringe-
ment under section 271(g).  The second step is the patentee’s response to 
the request which is expected to identify “all process patents owned by or 
licensed to him that he reasonably believes could be used to make his own 
product.” Since it was envisioned that the requesting party would be an 
importing party, the “request for disclosure must include a representation . 
. . that [the requesting party] will submit the [patentee’s] response to its 
manufacturer.”112  
If the procedure is followed, section 287(b)(3) qualifies section 
287(b)(4) by deeming the defendant importer to have acted in good faith 
when determining remedies for infringement, and thus avoiding treble 
damages.113  Section 287(b)(3)(B) provides that a defendant importer acts 
  
ing sentence, the term “all products” does not include products made before the effective date of the 
Process Patent Amendments Act of 1988. 
 
35 U.S.C. § 287(b)(4) (1999). 
 110. Sen. Rpt. 100-83 at 53. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 54. 
 113. (3)(A) In making a determination with respect to the remedy in an action brought for infringe-
ment under section 271(g), the court shall consider-- 
(i) the good faith demonstrated by the defendant with respect to a request for disclosure, 
(ii) the good faith demonstrated by the plaintiff with respect to a request for disclosure, and 
(iii) the need to restore the exclusive rights secured by the patent. 
(B) For purposes of subparagraph (A), the following are evidence of good faith: 
(i) a request for disclosure made by the defendant; 
(ii) a response within a reasonable time by the person receiving the request for disclosure; and 
(iii) the submission of the response by the defendant to the manufacturer, or if the manufacturer is 
not known, to the supplier, of the product to be purchased by the defendant, together with a request 
for a written statement that the process claimed in any patent disclosed in the response is not used 
to produce such product. 
The failure to perform any acts described in the preceding sentence is evidence of absence of good faith 
unless there are mitigating circumstances. Mitigating circumstances include the case in which, due to 
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in good faith when he submits the plaintiff’s response to the request for 
disclosure to the supplier’s manufacturer with a request for a written state-
ment from the manufacturer that the process used in manufacturing does 
not use any of the plaintiff’s disclosed patented processes.  Therefore, sec-
tions 287(b)(3) cannot be used to limit the scope of section 271(g) because 
it was enacted to address the concerns of importers of goods manufacturers 
abroad.   
Further, section 287(b) applies a stricter standard of notice than section 
287(a)114 to certain groups of process patent infringers.115  Section 287(a) 
existed before the enactment of the PPAA and provided that notice was 
required for patented products in order to recover damages from an in-
fringer.116  Notice is not required on unpatented products made by a pat-
ented process when performed in the United States.117  However, this 
stricter standard does not apply to three categories of infringers, including 
those who actually used the process.118  Notably, if Bayer was found to be 
infringing, the limitation on damages under section 287(b) would not apply 
to Bayer.   
Section 271(g) is broader in scope than section 287(b).  Section 287(b) 
made reference to a manufacturer as a party that produces a product and 
the maker as a “person engaged in the manufacture of a product”119 be-
cause section 287(b) was enacted to address the situation described above.  
The purpose of section 271(g) was to broaden process patent protection by 
providing a remedy for a United States patentee where the patented process 
was used abroad and the product made by the patented process was subse-
quently imported, offered for sale, sold, or used in the United States.120  
  
the nature of the product, the number of sources for the product, or like commercial circumstances, a 
request for disclosure is not necessary or practicable to avoid infringement. 
 
35 U.S.C. § 287(b)(3) (1999). 
 114. (a) Patentees, and persons making, offering for sale, or selling within the United States any 
patented article for or under them, or importing any patented article into the United States, may give 
notice to the public that the same is patented, either by fixing thereon the word “patent” or the abbre-
viation “pat.”, together with the number of the patent, or when, from the character of the article, this 
can not be done, by fixing to it, or to the package wherein one or more of them is contained, a label 
containing a like notice. In the event of failure so to mark, no damages shall be recovered by the pat-
entee in any action for infringement, except on proof that the infringer was notified of the infringement 
and continued to infringe thereafter, in which event damages may be recovered only for infringement 
occurring after such notice. Filing of an action for infringement shall constitute such notice. 
 
35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (1999). 
 115. Sen. Rpt. 100-83 at 52. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. 35 U.S.C. § 287(b)(4)(A) (1999). 
 120. Sen. Rpt. 100-83 at 2. 
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Section 287(b) addresses concerns of importers who import a product of a 
patented process used abroad.  On the other hand, section 271(g) also pro-
vides a remedy when the product is used or sold in the United States.   
C. Exceptions Swallow the Intent of the Rule   
Congress crafted the exceptions in section 271(g) narrowly because 
Congress wanted the courts to determine the scope of section 271(g) with-
out being unnecessarily hampered.121  The legislative history did not af-
firmatively address the use of a patented research tool abroad probably 
because this issue was simply not considered.122  Further, Congress never 
affirmatively dealt with information as a product for the same reason.123  
The Federal Circuit’s reasoning that information should not be considered 
a product under section 271(g) is sound.  Nevertheless, section 271(g) was 
not enacted to protect only “products that are physical goods produced by a 
manufacturing process.”124  The exceptions in section 271(g) were crafted 
narrowly to prevent the exception of too many products that have been 
changed in insignificant ways, but left to judicial discretion the determina-
tion of the scope of section 271(g) protection.125  Further, unlike other for-
eign patent statutes that use the word “directly” to modify “made,” Con-
gress decided that the “courts will be in a better position” to settle prox-
imity issues without the “directly” standard “constraining their judg-
ment.”126   
The Federal Circuit was aware that Congress gave the courts the duty 
to determine the scope of section 271(g).127  As the Federal Circuit stated 
in Bio-Technology, the exceptions in section 271(g) only answer the ques-
tion of “what products ‘will . . . not be considered’ to have been ‘made by’ 
a patented process.”128  Section 271(g) “does not specify what products 
will be considered to have been ‘made by’ the patented process, apparently 
because Congress wanted the courts to resolve this critical question of 
proximity . . . on a case-by-case basis.”129   
Further, Congress established a two-part test to help courts interpret 
the scope of the exceptions to section 271(g).130  The two-part test is con-
  
 121. See id. at 49. 
 122. See id. at 52. 
 123. See id. 
 124. See Bayer, 340 F.3d at 1372. 
 125. Sen. Rpt. 100-83 at 49. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Bio-Technology, 80 F.3d at 1561. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Sen. Rpt. 100-83 at 50. 
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sistent with a broad interpretation of section 271(g), which makes the off-
shore use of a patented research tool to identify a drug candidate subse-
quently used in the United States an infringing act.  The first part of the test 
is not met “if it would not be possible or commercially viable to make that 
product but for the use of the patented process.”131  If Housey’s patented 
research tool was the only way or only commercially viable way to identify 
the drug candidate, Bayer’s actions would not be excluded under this part 
of the test.  The second part of the test allows an exception under section 
271(g) if additionally unpatented steps were taken that physically and ma-
terially change the product.132  The drug candidate is not physically nor 
materially changed when used in the United States.  Further, a material 
change is one that is related to the physical or chemical property of the 
product.133  The use of the research tool by Bayer is actually what identi-
fied the material chemical/biological property of the drug candidate.  The 
identification of the chemical/biological property gave the drug candidate 
value.    
D. Section 271(g) Broadened Protection Consistent with ITC Protection 
Congress enacted section 271(g) to broaden protection consistent with 
ITC protection because section 271(g) provides remedies to parties that 
could not seek relief through the ITC.134   Although Congress enacted sec-
tion 271(g) to provide additional remedies to process patent owners be-
cause “[t]he ITC, unlike a Federal Court in a patent infringement suit, can 
award no damages,” Congress also enacted section 271(g) to protect par-
ties that could not meet the more elaborate test needed to exclude infring-
ing products by an ITC order.135  Included in the ITC test is that a patentee 
“must show that there is an industry in the United States which generally 
means that the patentholder must practice a patented process commer-
cially.”136  Congress recognized that this approach conflicts with the pol-
icy137 behind the United States patent system because it offers no protec-
tion when the inventor “chooses not to commercialize the invention.”138  
Despite the inconsistency between United States patent policy and the ITC 
approach, Congress recognized that “the ITC forum will remain a useful 
  
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 49. 
 135. Id. at 37. 
 136. Id. 
 137. A patent grants the right to exclude others, but does not place an affirmative duty on the patentee 
to practice the invention.  See e.g. Contl. Paper Bag v. E. Paper Bag, 210 U.S. 405, 424 (1908). 
 138. Sen. Rpt. 100-83 at 37. 
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supplement” because it “can provide speedy and comprehensive injunctive 
relief . . . while the patentholder awaits the outcome of the trial in federal 
court.”139   
Additionally, Congress wanted the federal courts to provide the patent-
type infringement analysis the federal courts are in the best position to pro-
vide.140  Further, the ITC in the past recommended “that a distinction be 
maintained between the patent-type protection for process inventions . . . 
and the trade-type protection currently afforded by the ITC” because the 
expertise of the ITC is in micro-economic analysis.141  Therefore, in enact-
ing section 271(g), Congress contemplated a broader statutory scheme and 
thus, did not merely add additional remedies that were not available under 
the ITC.   
Congress enacted section 271(g) to provide remedies to parties that 
could not seek relief through the ITC and to provide the patent-type in-
fringement analysis the federal courts were in the best position to provide 
in all cases.142  This analysis includes determining what physical “articles” 
would amount to “products” under section 271(g). 
A drug candidate identified using a patented research tool is an article 
consistent with the broader interpretation of articles under the ITC.  The 
language of section 1337 attempts to cover any physical product associated 
with a patented process used abroad.  Even if section 271(g) was enacted to 
only cover the same articles as 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B),143 the Federal 
Circuit concedes that the language of section 1337 is broader on its face 
than the language of section 271(g).144  Section 1337 protects articles that 
“are made, produced, processed, or mined under, or by means of, a process 
covered by the claims of a valid and enforceable United States patent.”145   
ITC protection, as the language indicates, attempts to cover any physi-
cal product associated with a patented process used abroad.146  Section 
271(g) was enacted as broad legislation where the existence of the ITC 
  
 139. Id. at 38.  
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 38, 49.  
 143. (B) The importation into the United States, the sale for importation, or the sale within the United 
States after importation by the owner, importer, or consignee, of articles that-- 
(i) infringe a valid and enforceable United States patent or a valid and enforceable United States 
copyright registered under Title 17; or 
(ii) are made, produced, processed, or mined under, or by means of, a process covered by the 
claims of a valid and enforceable United States patent. 
 
19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B) (2004). 
 144.  Bayer, 340 F.3d at 1374 n. 9. 
 145. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B)(ii); see also Bayer, 340 F.3d at 1374 n. 9.   
 146. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B)(ii). 
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would act as a supplemental forum to quickly procure injunctions.147  Al-
though the language of section 1337 does not suggest that information is 
covered, the language does suggest that section 271(g) was intended to 
cover more than manufactured physical goods. 
E. Legislative Intent 
Congress enacted section 271(g) to deter commercial uses of biotech-
nology process patents abroad.148  Congress wanted the courts to determine 
the scope of “made by” and therefore Congress specifically left to the 
courts the task to expand section 271(g) interpretation consistent with the 
goals of section 271(g) enactment.149  Congress broadly recognized the 
importance of enacting section 271(g) to protect biotechnology process 
patents, stating that  “[p]rocess patents promise to be increasingly impor-
tant to a number of industries in the coming years . . . above all in the fields 
of biotechnology and bioengineering research.”150  Congress later noted 
“that many of the ‘products’ produced by patented biotechnology proc-
esses are themselves ‘used’ in the manufacture of another product which is 
introduced into commerce.”151  Further, Congress stated that the “bill’s 
provisions limiting remedies against users are not intended to apply to such 
commercial uses.”152   
Congress probably intended section 271(g) to apply to commercial 
uses of biotechnology patented process abroad even if the product of the 
use will not be manufactured by the process directly.  To illustrate this 
statement, Congress used the example of a process patent for engineering a 
bacterium that will produce an unpatented end product.153  This example is 
cited in Bio-Technology as showing Congress’s affirmative attempt to pro-
tect the process patents owned by Genentech.154  This example was the 
only illustration in the Senate Report showing how “the field of biotech-
nology is particularly susceptible to commercial ‘uses’ without sales.”155   
Congress used the microorganism made by a patented process abroad 
as an example of how “merely stopping importation and non-retail sale of 
the microorganism after its entry into the country fails to prevent commer-
  
 147. Sen. Rpt. 100-83 at 49. 
 148. Id. at 30. 
 149. Id. at 49. 
 150. Id. at 30.   
 151. Id. at 49. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Bio-Technology, 80 F.3d at 1561. 
 155. Sen. Rpt. 100-83 at 49. 
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cial use of the microorganism.”156  This is an observation that once the self-
replicating unpatented microorganism has gained entry into the United 
States, there is no prohibition on its use in making the final end-product 
without protection under section 271(g). 
The example is analogous to the fact pattern in Bayer.  Once the re-
search tool is used abroad, the importation or use of the unpatented drug 
candidate in the United States has no protection unless afforded protection 
under section 271(g).  Without protection, Bayer is free to use the patented 
process for drug discovery.  If the drug candidate later proves to be fit for 
commercial sales, Bayer will not need to use the patented process to make 
the commercial product.  A comparison between Bio-Technology and 
Bayer, on the facts, is developed further in the following section.    
F. The Facts in Bayer are Analogous to the Facts in Bio-Technology 
Bayer is analogous to Bio-Technology because the discovery of an im-
portant biological property of a drug candidate is the product and is em-
bodied in the drug itself.  Additionally, Bayer is analogous to Bio-
Technology because cloning a gene into a host functions “merely as a 
predicate process” to “manufacturing” (by expression of) the hormone.  
Similarly, identifying a drug candidate functions “merely as a predicate 
process” to “manufacturing” the drug.   
The “manufacturing” of biotechnology products is not done by tradi-
tional “manufacturing” protocols. Therefore, biotechnological “manufac-
turing” is merely analogous to traditional “manufacturing.”  In Bio-
Technology, the process patents are directed to the process of genetically 
modifying the naturally occurring hGH gene.157  Then the process enables 
expression of this gene through a bacterial host.158  Once the gene is in-
serted directly or indirectly into the bacterial host, the bacterial host natu-
rally expresses the hGH protein product encoded by the hGH gene.159  
Genentech did not synthesize the hGH protein, but rather engineered a 
microorganism capable of producing a human protein product that could 
only be previously obtained from the pituitary glands of human cadav-
ers.160  The patented method is preferable because once the self-replicating 
bacterial host is engineered, the method provides for a never-ending supply 
of the hGH protein.  In traditional manufacturing terminology, Genentech 
built the factory which is capable of making the product.  Nevertheless, 
  
 156. Id. 
 157. Bio-Technology, 80 F.3d at 1557. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. at 1556-1557. 
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Genentech has a patent on the whole process including the construction of 
the “factory” (the engineered bacterium) and the steps taken by the bacte-
rium to produce the “product.”   
Analogous to the bacterial host produced by the patented process, the 
cell line produced by the patented process of Housey function as a popula-
tion of “factories.”  Nevertheless, the method of Housey also protects the 
exposure of the cell line created to a drug candidate and the comparison of 
changes between the over-expressing cell line and the original cell line.  
The patented process of Housey also involves constructing a specific type 
of cell using bio-engineering methods.161  This cell is part of a greater 
population of identical cells called a cell line.  The process involves using 
biotechnological methods to produce a population of cells that have the 
characteristic of substantial increased expression of a particular protein 
when compared to the original non-manipulated population of cells.162  
During the performance of the process, the cell line is temporarily pheno-
typically changed163 by the application of a drug candidate as compared to 
the original over-expressing cell line.  The question becomes whether the 
product of this process is the identified drug candidate, the phenotypically 
changed cell line, or the information gleaned from the exposure of the drug 
candidate followed by a comparison of the corresponding phenotypically 
changed cell line.   
Information and the phenotypically changed cell lines are not products 
of the method; rather they are necessary for performing the process.  Turn-
ing to claim 1 of Housey’s U.S. Pat. No. 4,980,281, the fourth step in the 
method is to “compar[e] the phenotypic response of the first cell line [over-
expressing] to the substance [e.g. a drug candidate] with the phenotypic 
response of the second cell line.”164  In order to make a comparison, infor-
mation about the phenotypic response had to be generated.  Conversely, a 
phenotypical response in the cell line had to occur in order to generate in-
formation for comparison.   
The discovery of an important biological property of the drug candi-
date is the product and is embodied in the drug itself.  While the drug can-
didate itself may or may not be patentable depending on whether it meets 
the novel, useful, and non-obvious standard of patentability, any new 
  
 161. Bayer, 340 F.3d at 1369. 
 162. Id. 
 163. A “phenotypic change” occurs if the application of the drug candidate changes expression of any 
genes as compared to before the addition of the drug candidate.  Therefore, if the drug candidate is an 
activator or inhibitor of a protein of interest, the change in expression of the protein by the cell is a 
phenotypic change (response).  Biotechterms, http://biotechterms.org/sourcebook/saveidretrieve. 
php3?id=1451 (accessed November 17, 2005).  “Temporarily” is used because this change is probably 
not permanent. The drug candidate will at some time cease to be active in the cell.   
 164. U.S. Pat. No. 4,980,281, claim 1. 
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treatment utilizing the biological properties of the drug candidate will be 
patentable.165  A biological property of the drug candidate is more than 
mere “information” about the drug candidate, it is the drug candidate.  The 
novel biological property potentially renders the use of the drug as pat-
entable.166  A property and its corresponding compound are not separable.  
While discovery of a natural phenomenon is not itself a patentable product, 
the application of a biological phenomenon embodied in a tangible inven-
tion (e.g. a pharmaceutical drug) is.167 
V.  SOUND ECONOMIC POLICY ENCOURAGES FOREIGN PROTECTION 
A. The Integra Decision168 
1. Background 
In Integra, a scientist (Dr. Cheresh) at Scripps discovered that blocking 
a certain class of receptors inhibits the process for generating new blood 
vessels (angiogenesis) and inhibiting the process for generating new blood 
vessels “showed promise as a means to halt tumor growth.”  Merck recog-
nized the importance of this discovery and “hired Scripps . . . to identify 
potential drug candidates that might inhibit angiogenesis.”  Dr. Cheresh’s 
research suggested that a specific cyclic peptide (i.e. drug candidate) may 
inhibit angiogenesis.  “Merck then entered into an agreement with Scripps 
to fund the ‘necessary experiments to satisfy the biological bases and regu-
latory (FDA) requirements for the implementation of clinical trials’ with” 
the drug candidate.  Scripps discovered two derivatives of the drug candi-
date and conducted several in vivo and in vitro experiments to determine if 
  
 165. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, & 103 (2000).  
 166. If the drug candidate is found to have a medical use based on the novel biological property, then 
the use is patentable.  See id. 
 167. See Mackay Radio & Telegraph v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 618 (1939) (This case stands 
for the proposition that while a scientific truth, or the mathematical expression of it, is not a patentable 
invention, a novel and useful structure created with the aid of knowledge of scientific truth may be a 
patentable “invention.”). 
 168.  In Merck v. Integra Lifesciences, 125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005), the United States Supreme Court va-
cated and remanded the Integra decision.  The Supreme Court held that a patented compound (e.g. drug 
candidate) used in preclinical studies is protected under section 271(e) as long as there is a reasonable 
basis for believing the patented compound could be the subject of an FDA submission and the experi-
ments conducted on the patented compound will produce information relevant to an investigational new 
drug application (IND) or a new drug application (NDA).  Id. at 2380-84.  Thus, the Supreme Court 
holding provides an exemption for infringement under the safe harbor provision for some preclinical 
studies.  Id.   
  Nevertheless, the Merck decision is not directed to research tool patents.  The Supreme Court 
expressly rejects the characterization of the patented compounds in this case as research tools, stating: 
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any of the derivatives may be suitable for testing in humans.  Integra 
learned of the research, conducted by Scripps in the United States, and 
believed it infringed one of its patents, and after a failed license negotiation 
with Merck, this suit was brought.169 
2. Analysis 
The issue was “whether pre-clinical research conducted under the 
Scripps-Merck agreement [was] exempt from liability for infringement of 
Integra’s patents under [section] 271(e)(1)” because “[t]he Scripps-Merck 
experiments did not supply information for submission to the United States 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA), but instead identified the best drug 
candidate to subject to future clinical testing under the FDA processes.”170  
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) provides: 
It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or 
sell within the United States or import into the United States a pat-
ented invention . . . solely for uses reasonably related to the devel-
opment and submission of information under a Federal law which 
regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary bio-
logical products.171 
The Federal Circuit found that “the context of this safe harbor origi-
nally keyed its use to facilitating expedited approval of patented pioneer 
drugs already on the market” by generic drug companies after the patent 
expired.172 
  
 169.   
The Court of Appeals also suggested that a limited construction of § 271(e)(1) is necessary 
to avoid depriving so-called “research tools” of the complete value of their patents. Respon-
dents have never argued the RGD peptides were used at Scripps as research tools, and it is 
apparent from the record that they were not. See 331 F.3d, at 878 (Newman, J., dissenting) 
(“Use of an existing tool in one's research is quite different from study of the tool itself”) 
[(Now citing to  2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 27796)]. We therefore need not-and do not-express 
a view about whether, or to what extent, § 271(e)(1) exempts from infringement the use of 
“research tools” in the development of information for the regulatory process.  
 
Id. at n. 7.  I agree that the patent compounds in this case are being used as drug candidates and not as 
research tools for discovering drug candidates.   
  The holding of this case will have far reaching effects on the biotechnology industry regarding 
what preclinical research will fall under the safe harbor provision.  Nevertheless, all preclinical re-
search will not be exempted under section 271(e) as the case makes clear.  Therefore, domestic protec-
tion will still exist for research tools while foreign protection will still be lacking for research tools 
under section 271(g). 
 169.    Integra, 331 F.3d at 863. 
 170. Id. at 865.  
 171. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000). 
 172. Integra, 331 F.3d at 867.  
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3. Holding 
The Federal Circuit held that “[e]xtending [section] 271(e)(1) to em-
brace all aspects of new drug development activities would ignore its lan-
guage and context.”173  In other words, section 271(e)(1), the safe harbor 
provision, does not allow a company to use a patented pharmaceutical to 
identify potential drug candidates hoping to one day bring the drug candi-
date to clinical trials.174 
B. Economic Impact of Integra in Conjunction with Bayer 
The Bayer decision in conjunction with the Integra decision encour-
ages foreign and domestic companies to use research tools protected by a 
United States patent abroad.  In Integra, the Federal Circuit held that 35 
U.S.C. § 271(e) is not a true “experimental use” exception.175  Under In-
tegra, a company cannot use, without authorization, a patented research 
tool in the United States to identify a potential drug candidate in the hopes 
of subjecting the drug candidate to clinical trials under the regulation of the 
FDA.176  Under Bayer, a company can use, without authorization, a pat-
ented research tool abroad to identify a potential drug candidate.177   
In strong support for domestic enforcement of patented research tools, 
the Federal Circuit stated: 
For example, expansion of [section] 271(e)(1) to include the 
Scripps-Merck activities would effectively vitiate the exclusive 
rights of patentees owning biotechnology tool patents.  After all, 
patented tools often facilitate general research to identify candidate 
drugs, as well as downstream safety-related experiments on those 
new drugs.  Because the downstream clinical testing for FDA ap-
proval falls within the safe harbor, these patented tools would only 
supply some commercial benefit to the inventor when applied to 
general research.  Thus, exaggerating [section] 271(e)(1) out of 
context would swallow the whole benefit of the Patent Act for 
some categories of biotechnological inventions.178 
Despite the strong support for biotechnology research tool patents in In-
tegra, this protection cannot be reconciled with the Bayer decision.  Strong 
  
 173. Id.  
 174. Id. 
 175. 331 F.3d at 870; see 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1). 
 176. 331 F.3d at 874. 
 177. 340 F.3d at 1377. 
 178. Integra, 331 F.3d at 867. 
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domestic protection of research tools is incompatible with a lack of foreign 
protection because companies will be encouraged to perform pre-clinical 
research abroad.   
Therefore, some foreign and domestic companies were correct in  
believ[ing] they have found a lawful way to use the patented proc-
esses, without paying royalties, simply by employing the methods 
in a foreign country in which the patentee does not have patent 
protection and then providing the relevant data to a customer (or 
subsidiary) in the U.S., who then proceeds to construct or use the 
molecule identified by the patented method—but without ever us-
ing the method itself in the U.S.179   
The lack of foreign protection prevents “many biotechnology companies 
[who] based their business models on the presumed ability to get royalties 
on pharmaceutical products developed using their patented drug discovery 
tools” from collecting such royalties.180  
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Section 271(g) should be broadened to encompass as an infringing act 
the use of a drug candidate in the United States when discovered by a pat-
ented research tool used abroad.  Specifically, this article proposes that the 
courts interpret the word “product” to cover the discovery of the drug as 
embodied by the actual drug.  The phrase “made by” should extend to all 
steps taken to bring a drug to market rather than be limited to physical 
“manufacturing.” 
The Federal Circuit correctly reasoned that information per se is not a 
“product” and that “it is beyond dispute that a drug is a physical product” 
under section 271(g).  Further, that “made by” is ambiguous according to 
the plain meaning of the statute and can be interpreted broadly to encom-
pass more than traditional “manufacturing.”  Additionally, the Federal Cir-
cuit recognized that the legislative history of section 271(g) “does not af-
firmatively suggest an intent to limit coverage to manufactured ‘articles.’”  
Section 271(g) is broader in scope than section 287(b).  The Federal 
Circuit inference that “made by” is equivalent to “manufactured” under 
section 287(b) is not justified.  Section 287(b) cannot be used to limit the 
scope of section 271(g) because section 271(g) was enacted to address the 
concerns of importers of goods manufacturers abroad.  On the other hand, 
  
 179. See Thayer, supra n. 3, at 87. 
 180. Groombridge, supra n. 2, at 462. 
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section 271(g) also provides a remedy when the product is used or sold in 
the United States after a manufacturer used the patented process abroad 
without authorization.  Bayer is a manufacturer, not an importer, who used 
a patented process abroad without authorization.   
Congress crafted the exception in section 271(g) narrowly because 
Congress wanted the courts to determine the scope of section 271(g) with-
out being unnecessarily hampered.  The Federal Circuit was aware that 
Congress gave the courts the duty to determine the scope of section 271(g).  
Further, Congress established a two-part test to help courts interpret the 
scope of the exceptions to section 271(g).  The two-part test is consistent 
with a broad interpretation of section 271(g).  Identifying a drug candidate 
would not be exempted from infringement under the congressional test.  
The identification of the drug candidate using the patented process was the 
only way to make the identification and the drug candidate will not change 
upon use in the United States. 
Congress enacted section 271(g) to broaden protection consistent with 
ITC protection because section 271(g) provides remedies to parties that 
could not seek relief through the ITC.  Additionally, Congress wanted the 
federal courts to provide the patent-type infringement analysis the federal 
courts are in the best position to provide.  Therefore, in enacting section 
271(g), Congress contemplated a broader statutory scheme and thus did not 
merely add additional remedies that were not available under the ITC.  ITC 
protection attempts to cover any physical product associated with a pat-
ented process used abroad and section 271(g) should be consistent with 
ITC protection.  A drug candidate is a physical product associated with the 
use of patented research tool abroad.   
Congress enacted section 271(g) to prevent commercial uses of bio-
technology process patents abroad.  Congress wanted the courts to deter-
mine the scope of “made by” and therefore Congress specifically left to the 
courts the task to expand section 271(g) interpretation consistent with the 
goals of section 271(g) enactment.  Congress intended section 271(g) to 
apply to commercial uses of a biotechnology patented process abroad even 
if the product of the use will not be manufactured by the process directly.  
The legislative history shows that Congress expressly anticipated the fact 
pattern in Bio-Technology.  A drug candidate is not “manufactured” di-
rectly by a patented research tool.  Nevertheless, the intention of Congress 
was to protect the commercial use of a research tool under section 271(g).   
Bayer is analogous to Bio-Technology because the discovery of an im-
portant biological property of a drug candidate is the product and is em-
bodied in the drug itself.  Additionally, Bayer is analogous to Bio-
Technology because cloning a gene into a host functions “merely as a 
predicate process” to “manufacturing” (by expression of) the hormone.  
File: Barthalow (macro) Created on:  12/20/2005 12:16:00 AM Last Printed: 12/20/2005 12:25:00 AM 
120 PIERCE LAW REVIEW Vol. 4, No. 1 
Similarly, identifying a drug candidate functions “merely as a predicate 
process” to “manufacturing” the drug.  Further, the “manufacturing” of 
biotechnology products is not done by traditional “manufacturing” proto-
cols; therefore biotechnological “manufacturing” is merely analogous to 
traditional “manufacturing.”  The phrase “made by” should be interpreted 
to encompass more than physical “manufacturing,” because a biotechno-
logical product is not “manufactured” in the traditional sense of the word. 
Sound economic policy encourages broadening the scope of protection 
under 271(g).  Despite the strong support for biotechnology research tool 
patents in Integra, this protection cannot be reconciled with the Bayer de-
cision.  Strong domestic protection of research tools is incompatible with a 
lack of foreign protection because more companies will be encouraged to 
perform pre-clinical research abroad.   
